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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Court Ann. § 78-2a-3.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1:

Did the Court err in determining that "Given the complex nature of the

case, Plaintiff (Appellant) shall be allowed a total of 50 requests for admissions."?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
2:

Did the Court err in determining that "Filing a Lien is not a "Civil

Action" Subject to the Statute of Limitations?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
3:

Did the Court err in determining that "Mr. Edwards' Claims Regarding

the 1995 and 1998 Liens are barred by the Statute of Limitations and the
Compulsory Counterclaim Rule?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Barley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
4:

Did the Court err in determining that Defendants failure to comply

with Rule 26 (c) in Defendants motion for a Protective Order valid?

1

The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Galll 967P.2d930

(Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah

Ct.App 1999).
5:

Did the Court err in determining that 'The District has dutifully

assessed Mr. Edwards' property each year and that the District was authorized by
statute to certify Mr. Edwards" account to Weber County for collection".?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley. 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
6:

Did the Court err in stating that "It appears to the Court that Appellant

took a claim to remove a lien or challenge a debt certified for collection and added
two dozen thornier causes of action in an effort get Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer's attention."?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
7:

Did the Court err in stating that "It appears to the Court that Appellant

employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District, The special improvement district responsible for the assessments and
collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors."

2

The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness oflaw. State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
8:

Did the Court err in determining that "It also appears that Appellant

augmented his complaint in order to increase the cost of litigation to the
defendants? Appellant himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very little
personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then watching the
defendants work to defeat them. On the other hand, the expense of defending
against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants."
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness oflaw. State v.
Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
9:

Did the Court err in determining that Rule 11 hearing was appropriate?

The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness oflaw. State v.
GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
10:

Did the Court err in determining that Rule 11 hearing was violated?

The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness oflaw. State v.
Galll, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999).
11:

Did the Court err in determining that the sanctions were appropriate?

The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
GallL 967 P. 2d 930 (Utah 1998); Slate v. Hurley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
CLApp. 1999).
12:

Did the Court err in determining that Judge Jones should be reclused

and or disqualified?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
13:

Did the Court err in determining that attorney fees and or the amount

of attorney fees awarded to the Defendants counsels were appropriate under Utah
Law?
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v.
Gain 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are many statutory provisions relevant to this appeal. The most
salient are the following and will be provided in Appellant's addendum, that will
be filed separately.
Constitution :
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 1. .Inherent and inalienable rights.
Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. § 10 -8 -38.

Drainage and sewage systems4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3

Court of Appeals jurisdiction

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

Attorney's fees -Award were action or defense
in bad faith

STATEMENT OF CASE
On March 22, 2006 Appellant filed the subject case in the Second District
Court.
That on or about 1981, Appellant purchased an unimproved lot on a
Uniform Real Estate Contract from Powder Mountain Inc. Appellant made all
payments under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to Powder Mountain Inc. and
Appellant has fully complied with the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Appellant
has made several demands to Powder Mountain Inc. to deed the subject property
to Appellant but Powder Mountain Inc. has failed to do so. Appellant's, First
Cause of Action" Appellant states "Plaintiff is entitled to decree ordering
Defendant Powder Mountain Inc., to transfer all right, title or interest to Appellant
or Appellant's assigns". Appellant has gone over 20 years attempting to obtain
title to property that Appellant should have obtained on or about 1983 but
Defendant Powder Mountain Inc has failed and refused to deed the subject
property to Appellant.
Prior to 1985 Weber County created Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District. That on or about June 25, 1985, Defendant Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District provided Appellant the July 1985, "Water Fee Schedule and
Agreement" and 1985 "Sewer Fees and Assessment". Appellant refused to
5

activate the July 1985, agreement(s) with Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
which was provided in the agreement(s). That on or about July 1, 1985, Appellant
was sent Appellant's first bill by Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District. Appellant refused to pay Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District because the interest rate exceed the rate provided by law and that
numerous other terms demanded by Defendant Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District were in violation of Utah Code. Defendant Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District policies then and now are in violation of the laws of the
State of Utah.
Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District filed liens against Appellant's
property on April 27, 1998, in the amount of $32,226.00 and on February 8, 1995,
in the amount of $20,685.00.
That on June 14, 1989, Appellant's ''connection rights" to water and sewer
were terminated by the Board of Directors of Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District effective July 1, 1989. Since July 1, 1989, Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District continued to charge Appellant for water and sewer to March 31,
1990 for Appellant's vacant lot. Appellant has never received any water and or
sewer service from Defendant Powder Mountain Water & Sewer.
That on Ihe May 4, 1988, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District
board stated "The board felt that the any further action at this time was not
necessary because we are not furnishing any water or sewer service at present time
but to let them [Delinquent members] reapply when the connections are needed at
6

the going rate". Thereafter Powder Mountain Water and Sewer continued to
charge Appellant for water and sewer fees.
Appellant has at all times refused to pay Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District and at no time has Appellant paid Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District. Appellant has at all times disputed the amount(s) that Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer District claimed due since 1985 and Appellant has
claimed that Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District policies are egregious
and are illegal under the laws of the State of Utah.
That on or about October 22, 1998, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case
number 980907203 and alleged in the complaint that Appellant's ''obligation to
the Water and Sewer District through October 1, 1998, is in the amount of
$36,209.75". That on or about August 3, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District dismissed Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's claim filed
against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case number 980907203.
That on or about March 1, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case
number 000901605 seeking $48,456.82 plus attorney fees and costs for water and
sewer. That Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District moved to dismiss case
number 000901605 in the Second Judicial District Court on or about July, 2001.
Case number 000901605 in the Second Judicial District Court was dismissed with
prejudice on or about July 23, 2001.
7

On May 15, 2002, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District through
Chuck Panter, Treasurer Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District, "certified
for collection" water and sewer assessments to Margarit Nersisian, of the Weber
County Clerk Auditor's Office. On May 31, 2002, the Weber County Clerk
Auditor's Office added Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's assessment
on Appellant's property in the amount of $24,140.10 as a property tax to
Appellant's property. That the amount "certified" by Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District on May 31, 2002, included charges dating back to July 7, 1985.
Appellant maintains that Powder Mountain Water & Sewer's certification of the
above lien was in violation of Utah Code and therefore void.
On March 22, 2006 Appellant filed the subject case in the Second District
Court. The case was assigned to Judge Jones.
On December 12, 2007, the Court filed an Order to Show Cause where
Judge Jones stated. "It appears to the Court that Appellant employed this familiar
tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District, the special
improvement district responsible for the assessments and collection efforts at
issue, as well as its employees and directors" and "It also appears that Plaintiff
augmented his complaint to increase the cost of litigation to the defendants",
"Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very little personal
effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then watching the defendants
work to defeat them", and "On the other hand, the expense of defending against so

8

many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants." Said statement was
not supported by any facts before the Court and was prejudicial to Appellant.
On December 29, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion to recluse and or
disqualify Judge Jones. On February 16, 2007, Appellant's Motion to disqualify
Judge Jones was denied.
On June 1, 2007, the Order to show cause hearing took place before Judge
Jones where Judge Jones found that Appellant violated Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and fined Appellant five hundred dollars and dismissed
Appellant's case without prejudice.
That on June 1 2008, Appellant asked Judge Jones, in open Court, if Judge
Jones had ever been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol. Judge Jones stated that
Judge Jones had been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol but it had been some
time. Judge Jones failure to disclose that Judge Jones had been a member of the
Powder Mountain Ski Patrol questions the impartiality of the Court.
The Court provided Defendants till June 20, 2007, to provide the Court
written briefs regarding that issue of'"attorney fees" and Appellant is to respond
by July 11,2007.
On July 16, 2007, the Court ruled that Defendants could not recover
attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11, because the motion was filed by the Court.
On September 4, 2007, attorney Stephen W. Farr filed a motion and
memorandum for attorney fees pursuant to UCA § 78-27-56 on behalf of the

9

Defendant Powder Mountain. On September 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion and
opposition together with a Memorandum and affidavit.
The Court found "the Complaint contained 31 causes of action. Only the
lien cause of action was a valid cause of action. The Court's finding that the lien
action was the only valid cause of action is unsubstantiated and completely
disregarded the undisputed facts of the case.
The Court awarded attorney fees to the parties represented by attorney
Stephen W. Farr in the sum of $10,055.78 and Steven Allred in the amount of
$5,400.00.
The final order appealed from was entered on January 16, 2008.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That on or about 1981 Appellant purchased an unimproved lot on a
Uniform Real Estate Contract from Powder Mountain Inc. Appellant made all
payments under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to Powder Mountain Inc. and
Appellant has fully complied with the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Appellant
has made several demands to Powder Mountain Inc. to deed the subject property
to Appellant but Powder Mountain Inc. has failed and refused to do so.
Prior to 1985 Weber County created Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District. That on or about June 25, 1985, Defendant Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District provided Appellant the July 1985, "Water Fee Schedule and
Agreement" and 1985 "Sewer Fees and Assessment". Appellant refused to
activate the July 1985, agreement(s) with Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
10

which was provided for in the agreement(s). That on or about July 1, 1985,
Appellant was sent Appellant's first bill by Defendant Powder Mountain Water
and Sewer District for water and sewer fees for Appellant's vacant lot. Appellant
refused to pay Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District because the
interest rate charged by Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District
exceeded the legal rate allowed and because the terms of the agreement were
egregious and in violation of the laws of the State of Utah.
Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District filed liens against Appellant's
property on April 27, 1998, in the amount of $32,226.00 and on February 8, 1995,
in the amount of $20,685.00. In addition on May 31, 2002, Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District certified to the Weber County Clerk Auditor's Office
that Appellant was indebted to Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's in
the amount of $24,140.10 which was thereafter added as a property tax to
Appellant's property.
That on June 14, 1989, Appellant's "connection rights" to water and sewer
were terminated by the Board of Directors of Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District effective July 1, 1989. Since July 1, 1989, Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District continued to charge Appellant for water and sewer to March 31,
1990.
That on the May 4, 1988, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District
board stated "The board felt that the any further action at this time was not
necessary beceiuse we are not furnishing any water or sewer service at present time
11

but to let them [Delinquent members] reapply when the connections are needed at
the going rate".
Appellant has at all times refused to pay Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District and at no time has Appellant paid Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District. Appellant has at all times disputed the amount(s) that Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer District claimed due and Appellant claims that the
charges are illegal under the laws of the State of Utah.
That on or about October 22, 1998, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
Distriet filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case
number 980907203 and alleged in the complaint that Appellant's "obligation to
the Water and Sewer District through October 1, 1998, is in the amount of
$36,209.75". That on or about August 3, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District dismissed Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's claim filed
against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case number 980907203.
That on or about March 1, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case
number 000901605 seeking $48,456.82 plus attorney fees and costs for water and
sewer. That Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District moved to dismiss case
number 000901605 in the Second Judicial District Court on or about July, 2001.
Case number 000901605 in the Second Judicial District Court was dismissed with
prejudice on or about July 23, 2001.
That on May 15, 2002, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District through
12

Chuck Panter, Treasurer Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District, "certified
for collection" water and sewer assessments to Margarit Nersisian, of the Weber
County Clerk Auditor's Office. That on May 31, 2002, the Weber County Clerk
Auditor's Office added Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's assessment
on Appellant's property in the amount of $24,140.10 as a property tax to
Appellant's property. That the amount "certified" by Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District on May 31, 2002, included charges dating back to July 7, 1985.
On March 22, 2006 Appellant filed the subject case in the Second District
Court.
On December 12, 2007, the Court filed Order to show cause. On June 1,
2007, the Order to show cause hearing took place before Judge Jones.
On December 29, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion to recluse and or
disqualify Judge Jones. On February 16, 2007, Appellant's Motion to disqualify
Judge Jones was denied.
On June 1, 2007, the Order to show cause hearing took place before Judge
Jones where Judge Jones found that Appellant violated Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and fined Appellant five hundred dollars and dismissed
Appellant's case without prejudice.
That on June 12008, Appellant asked Judge Jones if Judge Jones had ever
been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol. Judge Jones stated that Judge Jones had
been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol but it had been some time.

13

The Court provided Defendants till June 20, 2007, to provide the Court
written briefs regarding that issue of ''attorney fees" and Appellant is to respond
by July 11,2007.
On July 16, 2007, the Court ruled that Defendants could not recover
attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11, because the motion was filed by the Court.
On September 4, 2007, attorney Stephen W. Farr filed a motion and
memorandum for attorney fees pursuant to UCA § 78-27-56 on behalf of the
Defendant Powder Mountain. On September 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion and
opposition together with a Memorandum and affidavit.
The Court found "the Complaint contained 31 causes of action. "Only the
lien cause of action was a valid cause of action".
The Court awarded attorney fees to the parties represented by attorney
Stephen W. Farr in the sum of $10,055.78 and Steven Allred in the amount of
$5,400.00.
The final order appealed from was entered on January 16, 2008.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMMENT
Appellant's complaint was proper. Judge Jones finding that withe Complaint
contained 31 causes of action, and that "Only the lien cause of action was a valid
cause of action" is completely misplaced. As stated in Appellant's First Cause of
Action "Plaintiff is entitled to decree ordering Defendant Powder Mountain Inc.,
to transfer all right, title or interest to Appellant or Appellant's assigns".
Appellant has gone over 20 years attempting to obtain title to property that
14

Appellant should have obtained on or about 1983 but Defendant Powder Mountain
lnc has failed and refused to deed the subject property to Appellant not
withstanding Appellant's multiple demands.
All of the Defendants listed in Plaintiffs Complaint were and or are
officers and or agents of Defendant Powder Mountain, Defendant Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer and or Powder Mountain West Landowners
Association. Based upon the allegations in Appellant's complaint said Defendants
were involved in illegal conduct. Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
has charged interest rates that exceed the rates provided by the laws of the State of
Utah, has charged and currently charges water and sewer fees on vacant lots in
violation of Utah Code § 10-8-38, whose termination policy is and was egregious
and in violation of the laws of the State of Utah.
Judge Jones representations on December 12, 2007, in his Order to Show
Cause, in which Judge Jones stated that "It appears to the Court that Appellant
employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District, the special improvement district responsible for the assessments and
collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors" is unfounded and
not based on any facts before the Court. Judge Jones' unfounded statements were
grossly prejudicial to Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1

15

The Court erred in limiting Appellants request for admissions to a total of
50 request for all defendants.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in Rule 36. Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission.
(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including
the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The request for
admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the request is
made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or
within such shorter or longer time as the Court may allow. Copies of
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. Without
leave of Court or written stipulation, requests for admission may not be
served before the time specified in Rule 26(d).
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not set any limit on the
number of Admissions. The only limiting condition is that of "the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the
genuineness of any documents described in the request". Each and every
admission asked by Appellant is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure encourage the use of admissions to expedite
the trial by identifying issues that are in genuine dispute and by resolving those
that are not. Such a procedure avoids both a delay during the trial and the
unnecessary expense of proving a matter which is not in dispute. This is
accomplished by the receiving party either admitting or denying each request.

16

The purpose of Federal Rule 36 (and presumably Rule 36 of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure) is to expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the costs
of proving facts that will not be disputed at the trial, and the truth of which
can be easily ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Since the crucial
consideration is whether or not the answering party seriously intends to
dispute the fact, the proper procedure is for the answering party to admit
even if it lacks direct personal knowledge, but does not intend to place that
particular fact in issue. Beatrice, 1979 Lexis 597 at 3 (October 15, 1979)
(Order Ruling on Complaint Counsel's Third Request for Admissions).
Requests that are admitted will save time and expense at trial. Neither the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exclude
any of the types of admissions to which Defendant Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer object to. Nor does either limit the number of admissions that may be
propounded. Moore's Federal Practice 36.04[7], at 36-42 (2d. ed. 1995) ("The
terms of Rule 36 place no limitation on the number and detail of requests to
admit").
The admissions as a whole are not unduly burdensome. Defendant Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer objects to 433 admissions (458 minus 25). Defendant
Powder Mountain Water and Sewer raises no objection to any particular
admission. Yet, Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer seeks protection
from responding to any of Appellant's admissions (presumably even those which
are unobjectionable) because they claim the number of requests alone creates an
"undue burden." "Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party
objecting to show that responding to the discovery is unduly burdensome."
Snowden v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 332 (D. Kan. 1991). Where a
party contends that the sought discovery is unduly burdensome, it must come
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forward with specific information about how each item of discovery is
objectionable by "offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden." Roes berg
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296, (E.D. Pa. 1980). And it is clear that
the "mere fact that discovery requires work and may be time consuming is not
sufficient to establish undue burden." Fagan v. District of Columbia, 136 F.R.D.
5, 7 (D.D.C. 1991); see also Isaac v. Shell Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428, 431 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (discovery may not be avoided "merely because it may involve
inconvenience and expense"). Because admission requests serve the "highly
desirable" purpose of eliminating the need for proof of issues at trial, there is a
"strong disincentive" to finding an undue burden. See Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 91
F.R.D. 590. 594 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer makes no showing of undue
burden other than referring to the number of requests. That number alone,
however, is insufficient to establish undue burden, particularly where, as here, the
requests are relatively straightforward, and Defendant Powder Mountain Water
and Sewer answers will help narrow the issues for trial. See Roesberg, 85 F.R.D.
at 297; Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (blanket
assertions of undue burden are "not acceptable"); United States v. Marsten
Apartments, Inc., 1997 LEXIS 14262, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Indeed, Federal
Courts have refused to strike requests for admissions containing similar number of
requests on grounds of undue burden. Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28
F.R.D. 327, 28 (D. Mass. 1961) (requests requiring 704 separate answers). Other
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judges have refused to strike as unduly burdensome requests containing a greater
number of admissions than at issue here. See General Motors, 1977 FTC Lexis
293 (1976) (filing over 1,000 admission requests); Sterling Drugs, Inc., 1976 FTC
Lexis 272 (1976) (over 1,000 admission requests); Amrep Corp., 1976 Lexis 392
(over 1,000 admission requests).
Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer has not and cannot show
that Appellant's admission requests, taken as a whole in the context of this
litigation, impose an unreasonable burden. Accordingly, Defendant Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer motion for Protective Order to limit Appellant's
request to 25 was inappropriate and should have been denied.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that wC[i]f objection is made, the
reasons therefore shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or
set forth the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the
matter/' See Ride 36 (2). To the extent that Defendant Powder Mountain Water
and Sewer have legitimale objections to particular admission requests, they may so
indicate in their responses and seek appropriate relief at that time.
Admissions are a form of discovery to determine what is and is not
contested. IJ. R. C. P. Rule 36 (2) states that: "A party who considers that a matter
of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may
not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to the provisions
of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny
if \ An answer, rather than an objection, is now the only proper response if
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Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer considers that it has been asked to
admit something that it disputes. See Wright & Miller § 2256 and cases cited
therein.
Judge Jones limiting Appellant's Request for Admission to 50 for a case
involving 31 causes of Action, Defendant Powder Mountain Water & Sewer's lien
filed in 2002 dating back to 1985 involving 17 years of water and sewer fees
charged Appellant for Appellant's vacant lot and involving 20 defendants would
not provide Appellant with the ability to even ask each defendant more than 2
questions. Judge Jones' order provided that Appellant could only ask 50
admissions total for all Defendants represented by Stephen Farr.
Judge Jones statement that the case was complex is a contradiction of the
order limiting discovery for multiple defendants to a total of 50 Request for
Admissions. Judge Jones limitation of discovery was directly in contradiction of
intent and purpose of Rule 36. See Addendum 1 (Order on Motion for Protective
Order)
POINT 2
Did the Court err in determining that '"Filing a Lien is Not a "Civil Action"
Subject to the Statute of Limitations.
That on May 15, 2002, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District through
Chuck Panter. Treasurer Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District, "certified
for collection" water and sewer assessments to Margarit Nersisian, of the Weber
County Clerk Auditors Office. That on May 31, 2002, the Weber County Clerk
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Auditor's Office added Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District's assessment
on Appellant's property in the amount of $24,140.10 as a property tax to
Appellant's property. That the amount "certified" by Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer District on May 31, 2002, included charges dating back to July 7, 1985.
16.92 years lapsed from July 1, 1985, the first date that Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District began charging Appellant to May 31, 2002, when
Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District filed Defendant Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer District's certified lien with Weber County. On one
hand Powder Mountain Water and Sewer can charge Appellant water and sewer
charges and connection fees on a vacant lot back to the beginning of time and on
the other hand Appellant is limited by the Courts contention that the Statute of
Limitations and the Compulsory Counterclaim Rule. Said ruling is prejudicial in
that Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer rights are greater that that of
Appellant's which would be and is fundamentally unfair. Weber County is
collecting illegal fees that Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer has
charged Appellant. See Addendum 2 (Ruling).
POINT 3
Did the Court err in determining that "Mr. Edwards' Claims Regarding the
1995 and 1998 Liens are barred by the Statute of Limitations and the
CompulsoryCounterclaim Rule.
On May 15, 2002, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District "certified
for collection" water and sewer assessments to Weber County containing charges
dating back to July of 1985. The "assessments" contained water and sewer fees
21

and sewer connection fees to a vacant lot. Judge Jones decision that Filing a Lien
is Not a ""Civil Action" that is Subject to the Statute of Limitations but Appellant's
claims are barred by the Statue of Limitation and_Compulsory Counterclaim Rule
is illogical.
On or about October 22, 1998, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District
filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case number
980907203. On or about August 3, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
dismissed the District's claim because it was improperly before the Court. See
Affidavit of Catherine S. Conklin Pp 128-136 paragraph 2.
On or about March 1, 2000, Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District
filed suit against Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court case number
000901605. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District moved to dismiss case
number 000901605 on or about July, 2001. Said case was dismissed with
prejudice on or about July 23, 2001.
Defendant Powder Mountain Water and Sewer dismissed both causes of
action against Appellant. There being no final decision of the Court, Appellant is
not barred from raising issues that Appellant could have raised as an Omitted
Counterclaim pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 (e). To do otherwise
would prejudice any "defendant". A party could file an action against a
"Defendant" move to dismiss and thereafter claim that the "Plaintiff is exempt
based upon the Defendant failing to file a Compulsory Counterclaim." Certainly
the intent of Rule 13 (a) is based upon a final decision o f the Court.
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POINT 4
The Court erred in determining that Defendants failure to comply with Rule
26 (c) in Defendants motion for a Protective Order was valid.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in Rule 26 (c). General provisions
governing discovery.
Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to
resolve the dispute without Court action, and for good cause shown, the Court in
which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
Court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
That Defendant's Motion for Protective Order was not accompanied by a
certification that the Defendant had in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with Appellant in an effort to resolve the dispute without Court action pursuant to
Rule 26(c).
Defendant failed to confer or attempt to confer with Appellant in an effort to
resolve the dispute without Court action pursuant to Rule 26 (c), General
provisions governing discovery of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order was void for failure to attempt to
meet with Appellant in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute without Court
action pursuant to Rule 26 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge Jones failed to apply Rule 26 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. The Court's failure in
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enforcing Rule 26 (c) was prejudicial to Appellant. The Defendant presented
Appellant as "obstreperous". See Affidavit of Catherine S. Conklin Pp 128-136
paragraph .
POINT 5
The Court erred in determining that "The District has dutifully assessed
Mr. Edwards' property each year and that the District was authorized by
statute to certify Mr. Edwards' account to Weber County for collection.
On December 6, 2006, in the Court's ruling the Court states that fcThe
District has dutifully assessed Mr. Edwards' property each year". Defendant
Powder Mountain Water & Sewer ''assessment" includes water and sewer fees and
connection fees for vacant lots in violation of Utah Coded. The Court ruled
prematurely that the fees charged were assessments. See Addendum 10
"Appellants Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
That Defendant Powder Mountain Water And Sewer Charges for Vacant Lots
Violate Utah Code".
"§ 10-8-38 does not authorize the charging of a sewer connection fee in the
case of vacant lots/" Banberry Development Corporation, v. South Jordan City
631 P.2d899; 1981.
As the Court stated in the Courts ruling uThe District may also, if its
attempts to collect these assessments fail, certify the account to Weber County for
collection as an unpaid tax." Id at §17-A-2-210(3).
in Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary
District, we held that charges for use of a sewer system were service
charges, not taxes or assessments, they were "payments for services
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luinishcd" and weie l!lin nature oi tolls 01 paid tor seivices luinishcd 01
available m 738 P 2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987) (pei curiam) (quoting 1 1 1
McQiulhn, Municipal Coipoiations ^ 31 30 (3d leviseded 1983)) "
In the Couits conclusion on Decembei 6, 2006, the Couit stated that the
' l)i A\ ict was authon/ed by statute to ceitily Mi Ldwaids' account to Wcbci
( ounty loi collection""
1 he lees chaiged Appellant by Delendant Powdei Mountain Watu &.
Sewet do not constitute a "tax" undei Utah State Code
1 hcieloie the Distnct has not dutitully assessed Appellant's piopeity each
ycai and that the Distnct was not authorized by statute to certify Appellants
account to Webei County for collection
POINT 6
Did the Cow t ei t in stating that It appears to the Court that Appc hunt
took a claim to remove a hen oi challenge a debt certified for collection
and added two dozen thonuei causes oj action in an effort get Powdei
Mountain Watei and Sew ei s attention
1 hat on December 7, 2006, Judge Ernest W Jones signed an Order to Show
C ause why Appellant has not violated Rule 11(b)(1) in wheie Judge fones stated
"it appeals to the Coutt that Appellant took a claim to remove a hen or challenge a
debt cei tilled loi collection and added two dozen thorniei causes ot action in an
elloit get Powdet Mountain Watei and Sewef s attention " See Addendum 3,
Paiagiaph 5
Judge (ones assessment ol Appellant's case is inconsistent with the lacts ol
the case

Delendant Powdei Mountain Watei & Sewei policies and piactices aic
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in violation of the laws of the State of Utah. Defendant Powder Mountain Water
& Sewer current policy is in violation of the laws of the State of Utah. Defendant
Powder Mountain Welter & Sewer illegal policies prohibit Appellant from
developing Appellant's property. See Addendum 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13.
Defendant Powder Mountain Inc. has failed and refused to deed Appellant
the subject property not withstanding Appellants compliance with all terms of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract on or about 1983. See First Cause of Action of
Appellant's Complaint.
Article I, of the Utah Constitution provides "All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess
and protect property". Defendant Powder Mountain Inc. and Defendant Powder
Mountain Water & Sewer have both interfered with Appellants rights to acquire
and possess Appellant's property.
POINT 7
The Court erred in determining that "It appears to the Court that Appellant
employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District, The special improvement district responsible for the assessments
and collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors."
That on December 7, 2006, Judge Ernest W. Jones signed an Order to Show
Cause why Appellant has not violated Rule 11(b) (l)'s requirements that was
mailed on December 12th, 2006. That said order stated that "It appears to the
Court that Appellant employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District, the special improvement district responsible for the
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assessments and collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors."
without any facts to support the allegations of the Court. There are no undisputed
facts before the Court that would lead an unbiased party to conclude the above
statement of the Court.
The above statements clearly prejudiced Appellant because Defendant
Powder Mountain Water & Sewer used the substance of the Courts contentions as
defenses in Defendant Powder Mountain Water & Sewer's Memorandum in
Opposition to Appellant's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant
Powder Mountain Water and Sewer stated on December 14, 2006, in Defendant
Powder Mountain Water and Sewer's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's
motions for Partial summary Judgment; Request for Attorney's Fees that "As this
Court noted in its recently issued Order to Show Cause, there appears to be a
strong likelihood that this entire action has been filed solely to harass the District
and force it to spend attorney's fees". "Perhaps Appellant hopes that the District
might be compelled to retract its certification of the fees to Weber County, if a
retraction is even possible".
As previously stated Defendants failed to deed Appellant the subject
property after Appellant had complied with all terms of the Uniform Real Estate
Contact not withstanding Appellants multiple demands for said property to be
conveyed to Appellant. Defendants have charged Appellant for water and sewer
fees for a vacant lot contrary to the laws of the State of Utah. Defendants have
filed multiple liens in violation of Utah Code against the subject property.
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Defendants filed two legal actions against Appellant and dismissed same.
Defendants certified the lien to Weber County in violation of Utah Code.
Upon information and belief the Court's rulings, statements and findings
would lead a detached observer to conclude that Appellant failed to obtain a fair
and impartial hearing. If any party has been ''harassed" it has been Appellant.
Defendant's failure to deed the subject property to Appellant, multiple legal
actions, multiple illegal liens, illegal policies that prohibit Appellant from
developing the subject property add up to substantially more that Appellant has
tolerated than any of the Defendants.
POINT 8
The Court erred in determining that "It also appears that Plaintiff
augmented his complaint in order to increase the cost of litigation to the
defendants. Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very
little personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then
watching the defendants work to defeat them. On the other hand, the
expense of defending against so many meritless claims significantly
burdens the defendants."
On December 7, 2006, Judge Ernest W. Jones signed an Order to Show
Cause why Plaintiff has not violated Rule 1 l(b)'s where Judge Jones represented
that "It also appears that Plaintiff augmented his complaint to increase the cost of
litigation to the defendants", "Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and
expends very little personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then
watching the defendants work to defeat them", and "On the other hand, the
expense of defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the
defendants." have prejudiced Appellant and are clearly prejudicial.
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There was no evidence before the Court to suggest or imply that "It also
appears that Plaintiff augmented his complaint to increase the cost of litigation to
the defendants", "Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very
little personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then watching the
defendants work to defeat them", and "On the other hand, the expense of
defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants."
There is one statement of the Court that is true. '"Plaintiff himself is pro se". All
other assumptions of the Court are misplaced and false.
For Judge Jones to declare any cause of action against the Defendants to be
"meritless"" prior to the facts of the case being presented defies the purpose of the
Court system but Judge Jones stated that Appellant had "many meritless claims" is
judicially improper and demonstrates the Court's bias towards Appellant.
Judicial bias can clearly be shown to exist only where there is an
undisputed claim or where the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the
controversy before him. The Court on December 7, 2006 expressed an opinion in
the Court's Order to Show Cause stating uOn the other hand, the expense of
defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants."
For the Court to suggest or imply at this stage that Plaintiffs has "many meritless
claims" is not supported by the facts before the Court, is prejudicial and holds
Plaintiff to a higher standard than Defendant's. The Court stated that Appellant
"expends very little personal effort" is an unsupported allegation. The record does
not show any fact as to Appellant's effort. The memorandums before the Court
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are not Appellants ranting and raving about Appellant's grievances. Appellant's
memorandums are based upon the illegal acts of the Defendants, supported by
facts based upon the laws of the State of Utah. Plaintiff representing himself pro
se against at four attorneys in this case is not at any advantage. None of
Appellant's memorandums contains meritless claims.
Further said order stated "It also appears that Plaintiff augmented his
complaint to increase the cost of litigation to the defendants." and that ''Plaintiff
himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very little personal effort, in
drafting additional causes of action and then watching the defendants work to
defeat them". Plaintiff did not augment Appellant's complaint to increase the cost
of litigation to the defendants. Each and every cause of action in Appellant's
complaint was filed in good faith. That upon information and belief each and
every cause of action in Appellant's complaint is based upon the unlawful acts of
the Defendants. Defendant stated in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motions for Partial Summary Judgment; Request for Attorney's Fees
that it took "five hours" to respond to Appellant's 4 motions for partial summary
judgment. Appellant expended over 20 hours responding to Defendants
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
That Plaintiff on an average expended over 20 hours preparing each of Plaintiffs
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment for a total of approximately 80 hours.
Appellant expends a substantial effort in drafting each and every motion and all
pleadings because Appellant is Pro Se. Appellant has spent over 100 hours in
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making Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum to
Defendant's counsel of 5 hours. The Court's suggestion that Appellant "expends
very little personal effort" is unfounded and again prejudicial.
The statements and or allegations contained in the Courts Order to Show
Cause sufficiently shows prejudice against Appellant. Said statements by the
Court connote a disposition that is wrongful and inappropriate because it is
undeserved, it rests on knowledge that the Court ought not to possess, is false and
it is excessive in degree.
The statements and or allegations contained in the Courts Order to Show
Cause clearly are sufficient to overthrow the presumption as to the Court's
impartiality and therefore, sufficient to deny Appellant a fair hearing or trial.
POINT 9
The Court erred in determining that a Rule 11 hearing was appropriate.
Judge Jones statements that wTt also appears that Plaintiff augmented his
complaint in order to increase the cost of litigation to the defendants. Plaintiff
himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very little personal effort, in
drafting additional causes of action and then watching the defendants work to
defeat them. On the other hand, the expense of defending against so many
meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants." and that "It appears to the
Court that Appellant employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District, The special improvement district responsible for the
assessments and collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors."
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was not founded on any evidence that the Court had in the above action. Said
statements by the Court connote a disposition that is wrongful and inappropriate
because it is undeserved, it is not based upon facts before the Court, it rests on
knowledge that the Court ought not to possess, is false and it is excessive in degree
and therefore the rule 11 hearing was inappropriate.
POINT 10
The Court erred in determining that Rule 11 hearing was violated.
The Court stated that "there was no factual or legal basis for many of these
causes of action in Plaintiffs complaint. Some of these meritless causes o faction
include defamation, conspiracy, slander, mail fraud, three counts of RICO
violations and violation of the Hobbs Act" and that uThe Court finds that Plaintiff
took a claim to remove a lien or challenge a debt certified for collection and added
two dozen thornier causes of action in an effort to get Powder Mountain Water and
Sewer's attention. As previously stated Appellant's complaint is substantially
about more than "a claim to remove a lien or challenge a debt certified for
collection". See Addendum 6.
The Court's conclusions are inconsistent with the evidence and facts.
POINT 11
The Court erred in determining that the sanctions were appropriate.
Rule 11(c) provides as follows:
Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
Court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the Court may . . .
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impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in 2001, that;
"Rule 11(c) by its express terms vests discretion in the district Court. A
violation of rule 11(b) does not mandate the sanction of attorney fees."
Crank, v. The Utah Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, 20 P.3d 307
Rule 11(c) (2) provides as follows:
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the
limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into
Court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
Pursuant to Rule 11 (c) (2)"the sanction may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into Court, or, if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.".
The Court sanctioned Plaintiff with a $500.00 fine and dismissed Plaintiffs
case. Rule 11(c) (2) provides that the "Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient. . ." Rule
11(c) (2) refers to "a sanction" and "the sanction may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into Court, or, if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence" which all refer to a
single sanction. Rule 11(c) (2) provides the operator u or" and not "and" when
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providing the type of sanctions available for a rule 11 sanction. Rule 11(c) (2)
provides for a single sanction and not a series of sanctions. Plaintiff being fined
$500.00 by the Court, dismissing Plaintiffs case and the potential peril of being
exposed to multiple attorneys requesting attorney fees from the beginning of the
case where the Defendants are in violation of a multiple Code violations under
Utah Code would be exceptionally unjust, unwarranted and in violation of .Rule
11(c)(2).
POINT 12
The Court erred in determining that Judge Jones should be not be reclused
and or disqualified.
Judge Jones representations that "It appears to the Court that Appellant
employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer
District, The special improvement district responsible for the assessments and
collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors." and "It also
appears that Plaintiff augmented his complaint to increase the cost of litigation to
the defendants", "Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost, and expends very
little personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and then watching the
defendants work to defeat them", and "On the other hand, the expense of
defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants."
have prejudiced Appellant and are clearly prejudicial.
After the Courf s decisions regarding Appellant's Motion to Recluse,
Appellant was informed that Judge Jones had been on the Powder Mountain Ski
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Patrol. That on June 1 2008, Appellant asked Judge Jones if Judge Jones had ever
been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol. Judge Jones stated that Judge Jones had
been on the Powder Mountain Ski Patrol but it had been some time. Judge Jones
failure to inform all parties that Judge Jones had been a member of the Powder
Mountain Ski patrol certainly questions the integrity of Judge Jones decisions.
The management of Powder Mountain when Judge Jones was on the Powder
Mountain Ski Patrol is now the "Defendants" in Appellant's complaint in the
Second District Court.
The statements and or allegations contained in the Courts Order to Show
Cause sufficiently shows prejudice against Plaintiff. Said statements by the Court
connote a disposition that is wrongful and inappropriate because it is undeserved,
it rests on knowledge that the Court ought not to possess, is false and it is
excessive in degree.
The statements and or allegations contained in the Courts Order to Show
Cause clearly are sufficient to overthrow the presumption as to the Court's
impartiality and therefore, sufficient to deny Plaintiff a fair hearing or trial.
A judge is to enter a disqualification in instances where the judge has:
personal bias concerning a party or attorney, strong personal bias about an issue in
the case, or "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding." Utah Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(a). A judge is to "enter a
disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." Utah Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1).
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In State v. West, 34 P.3d 234 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), the State of Utah
requested an extraordinary writ that would require one judge to disqualify
another judge from hearing a certain case. The Utah Court of Appeals
granted the petition only to the extent of requiring the judge to reconsider
an affidavit of bias for the possibility that a "judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" even if no actual bias was shown. Id. at 234.
The Court said that "trial judges should recuse themselves when their
'impartiality' might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 203 (citing State v. Neeley,
748 P.2d 1091,1094 (Utah 1988)).
Judicial bias can clearly be shown to exist only where there is an
undisputed claim or where the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the
controversy before him. The Court on December 7, 2006 expressed an opinion in
the Court's Order to Show Cause stating wwOn the other hand, the expense of
defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants."
For the Court to suggest or imply at this stage that Appellant's has "many
meritlcss claims" is not supported by the facts before the Court, is prejudicial and
holds Appellant to a higher standard. Appellant representing himself pro se
against at least four attorneys in this case is not at any advantage. Defendant's
counsel has not made any motion to dismiss any cause of action.
In the Court's Order to Show Cause the Court states "It appears to the
Court that Appellant employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District, the special improvement district responsible for the
assessments and collection efforts at issue, as well as its employees and directors.'
Appellant has at no time employed any tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water
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and Sewer District, its directors, or employees (none of which are listed as
defendants), or its accountant. That each and every motion that Appellant has
made is based upon the laws of the State of Utah, the unlawful acts of the
Defendants and legal advise. Each and every discovery request that Appellant
made was relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. There is
no finding of the Court and no undisputed facts before the Court that would allow
the Court to find that Appellant has in harassed any party. For the Court to
conclude that Appellant "employed this familiar tactic to harass Powder Mountain
Water and Sewer District" the Court would have to have formed an opinion about
Appellant from sources external to the complaint and motions that have been
before the Court. The Courts ruling that Appellant's familiar tactic to harass, that
is unsubstantiated, is harassment, prejudicial and distressful. If for one second
Defendant's thought they could prove the Court's position the Defendant's would
certainly have filed a counterclaim against Appellant. The Court's statement
certainly indicates extra-judicial prejudice.
Appellant is the owner/agent of several properties that are adjacent to the
Weber County District Court. Appellant used Appellant's properties as a public
forum and posted signs that petitioned Ogden City Administration for redress.
Appellant's use of Appellant property as a political forum against Ogden City
Administration was very polarized. Appellant received a substantial amount of
press coverage over Ogden City's violation of Appellant's constitutional rights
and Appellant's petition for redress with Ogden City Administration.
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On January 23, 2002, Ogden City filed two informations charging
Appellant with "2 counts Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations:" fcwl. The
windows and glass doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a
manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of
Section 16-8B-9.J OMC, Class B", and "2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent
public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the
building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9-G OMC Class B" for each of Appellant's
properties.
On October 18, 2002, following a nonjury trial held in the Second Judicial
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ernest Jones presiding, Appellant
was found guilty of "Failure to Register a Vacant Building in violation of Ogden
Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16-8B-3, an infraction," and "Failure to
Provide Vacant Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8,
Section 16-8B-5, an infraction
On October 1st, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County,
in the case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards Civil No. 020900777, the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin, ruled on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. The Memorandum stated that Ogden City sign
ordinance 16-8B-9-G OMC was unconstitutional on its face and violates the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Upon Judge Baldwin's ruling the original charges against Appellant for
posting signs in the windows of Appellant's buildings violated Plaintiffs
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constitutional rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, Plaintiff moved Judge Jones to vacate Plaintiffs conviction because
Plaintiffs signs could not then be a public nuisance and therefore the original
informations where legally flawed.
On November 26, 2003, Judge Jones ruled on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and Vacate and the Judge Jones Plaintiffs Motion. The Court failed and
or refused to apply the law of the land to Appellant's case.
Appellant was the victim of a political prosecution where Ogden City used
the court system to persecute Appellant.
Appellant acting on his own behalf appealed the decision to the Utah State
Court of Appeals. On December 16, 2004 the Utah Court of Appeals stated "Even
if we assume that Ogden City proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's
buildings were "vacant," our review of the record reveals that Ogden City did not
prove that Defendant's buildings were vacant "for more than ninety (90) days," or
were vacant and "contained] one or more 'public nuisance violations.'" Ogden
City Municipal Code § 16-8B-3(A). Because Ogden City did not "prove every
element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt," Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at
TJ13, we reverse Defendant's convictions under section 16-8B-3 for failure to
register a vacant building. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. Further, because
Ogden City failed to prove that Defendant was guilty of failing to register his
buildings under section 16-8B-3, he could not have been obligated to file vacant
building plans for his buildings. See Ogden City Municipal Code § 16-8B-5
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(requiring an owner to "submit a vacant building plan" only "[w]hen a building is
registered as required" under section 16-8B-3). Therefore, we also reverse his
convictions under section 16-88-5."
Appellant does not raise the issue that Judge Jones had previously ruled
against Appellant but does so based upon the manner in which Judge Jones did so.
Judge Jones failed to apply the law of the land to Appellant's criminal charges for
having a sign in a window of an alleged 'Vacant building". The case involving
Ogden City combined with Appellant's current case clearly demonstrates a pattern
of prejudice towards Appellant.
POINT 13
The Court erred in determining that attorney fees and or the amount of
attorney fees awarded to the Defendants counsels were appropriate under
Utah Law.
On June 01, 2007, the Court stated in its Minutes that "The Court finds that
because the Court brought this motion, attorney's fees may not able to be awarded,
however, defense counsel are allowed 20 days to submit written briefs regarding
that issue, and Mr. Edwards is allowed 20 days to respond". See Addendum 5.
Further the Court stated that "To clarify, defendants shall submit by June
20, 2007, and Mr. Edwards is to respond by July 11, 2007. See Addendum 5.
The Court made clear to Plaintiff and in the Minutes on June 01, 2007, that
strict compliance to the order of the Court was required. The Court stated that c To
clarify, defendants shall submit by June 20, 2007, and Mr. Edwards is to respond
by July 11, 2007. Clearly the Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Attorneys Fees
is untimely and in violation of the last order of the Court.
The Order of the Court on June 01, 2007, did not limit Defendant's
arguments relating to the award of attorney fees. The Court stated "attorney fees
may not able to be awarded, however, defense counsel are allowed 20 days to
submit written briefs regarding that issue, and Mr. Edwards is allowed 20 days to
respond." The Defendants attorneys were provided 20 days to submit written
briefs regarding the issue of attorney fee(s) and thereafter the Court clarified that
Defendants briefs were due no later than June 20, 2007. Defendants thereafter did
not seek an extension.
Defendant's Counsel, Steven W. Allred, only filed Counsel's appearance of
counsel on February 11, 2007. Since filing Counsel's appearance of counsel
pursuant to Counsel "Statements" Counsel total hours representing the Defendants
is 1.7hours. Counsel stated that counsel spent 1.0 hours preparing for hearing on
May 31, 2007. Counsel's contention that he is entitled to fees prior to his
appearance is unfounded. See Addendum 7.
Defendant's counsel Steven Allred's Joinder in Motion in Support of
Attorney's Fees and Memorandum pursuant to the order of the Court is over 3
months after the deadline to respond to the Defendants motions. Defendant's
counsel Steven Allred's delay in filing Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Attorneys
Fees prejudiced Appellant.
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Defendant's failed to submit counsel's motion for attorney fees pursuant to
the order of the Court. Steven Farr submitted Steven Farr's Motion for Attorney
Fees on September 4, 2007, and Steven Allred joined Steven Farr's Motion on
September 25 th , 2007.
For Appellant to have to respond to the issues raised by Defendant's
Counsels prejudices Appellant in that the Court had previously provided that
Appellant had 20 days to respond to Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and for
the purpose of answering Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees now before this
Court, Appellant has had less than 10 days to respond pursuant to Rule 7 C 1 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant has had less than ten days to
respond to Mr. Steven Allred allegations. Defendant's late filing prejudiced
Appellant.
Defendants failed to identify any reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred. .
On June 1, 2007 this Court dismissed Appellant's complaint, which was a
final order and or judgment of the Court. The Court within said order provided
that the Defendants shall submit Defendant's Memorandum regarding attorney
fees by June 20, 2007. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 59(e) requires a motion
to alter or amend the judgment to be served not later than ten days after entry of
judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 52(b) motion to amend the trial
Court's Findings must be filed in the trial Court within the same time period. See
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Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Defendants are barred under Utah Rules to now after over 3
months request the Court to consider the Defendant's motion.
Under section §78-27-56, only those fees incurred in defending against a
claim are recoverable. Defendant's never defended against any "augmented"
claims.
Rule 54(d) provides that costs are awarded as of course to a prevailing
party and that the trial Court is to assess costs based on a verified memorandum of
costs, which must be filed by the successful party within five days after entry of
judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). The successful party must also serve a copy of
the verified memorandum on the adverse party within the same time. The rule
allows the adverse party seven days in which to object to the costs claimed.
Defendant's failed to separate Defendants attorney fees and costs in the
Affidavit of Steven Allred and Steven Farr whereby Defendants claim that the
pursuant to Rule 54(d). There are numerous fees that are not justified that
Appellant would be allowed to object to pursuant to Rule 54 (d) and therefore
Defendant's claims were not properly before the Court.
Utah Code § 78-27-56 provides as follows:
§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the Court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the Court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
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§ 78-27-56 requires a finding that the action or defense to the action was
without merit, this Court stated in the Court's Order to Show Cause that "Counts
14-28 are particularly troublesome to the Court. The Court did not find that the
action was without merit but that Appellant's complaint violated Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel's reliance on Utah Code § 78-27-56 is
completely misplaced. The plain and simple language of Utah Code § 78-27-56
requires the Court to determine the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith. Utah Code § 78-27-56 as applied to the above entitled
action is without merit.
Appellant had not brought any motions relating to any causes of action on
counts 14-28.
The Court has no authority to award any attorney fees based upon Utah
Code § 78-27-56. Defendants failed to identify any expenses or attorney fees that
were incurred as a direct result of the violation.
Defendant's motion states "if the Court finds both elements of § 78-27-56,
then it has no discretion and must aware (award) reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party". There was no finding that the case was without merit. The
Court did state that "On the other hand, the expense of defending against so many
meritless claims significantly burdens the defendants".
None of the claims that Judge Jones referred to had been defended against
by any of the Defendants and therefore even if Judge Jones was correct no
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Defendant had been prejudiced. Certainly Appellant should be entitled to advance
Appellant's case to prove the Causes of Action in Appellant's Complaint.
Clearly the Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Attorneys Fees is untimely and in
violation of the last order of the Court.
An award of attorney fees in the above entitled case is without merit, in
violation of the last order of the Court, prejudicial, a miscarriage of justice and
perpetuates Powder Mountain Water and Sewer's illegal and unlawful conduct.
The Court entered sanctions against Appellant for violating Rule 11 in the
amount of $500.00 and dismissed Appellant's complaint. Then not withstanding
the above sanction entered judgment against Appellant for attorney fees in the
amount $10,055.78 and $5,400.00. See Addendum 8.
An award of attorney fees in the above entitled case is without merit, in
violation of the last order of the Court, prejudicial, a miscarriage of justice and
perpetuates Powder Mountain Water and Sewer's illegal and unlawful conduct.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court limited Appellant's Request for admissions to 50 request
for all Defendants represented by Steven Far, and the preemptive statements of the
Court that "It also appears that Plaintiff augmented his complaint to increase the
cost of litigation to the defendants", "Plaintiff himself is pro se and incurs no cost,
and expends very little personal effort, in drafting additional causes of action and
then watching the defendants work to defeat them", and "On the other hand, the
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expense of defending against so many meritless claims significantly burdens the
defendants." and "It appears to the Court that Appellant employed this familiar
tactic to harass Powder Mountain Water and Sewer District, The special
improvement district responsible for the assessments and collection efforts at
issue, as well as its employees and directors."; that "the Court finds that Plaintiff
took a claim to remove a lien or challenge a debt certified for collection and added
tow dozen thornier causes of action in an effort to get Powder Mountain Water
and Sewer's attention" all without facts that would substantiate the Courts claims,
and that Judge Jones failed to disclose that Judge Jones was once a member of the
Powder Mountain Ski Patrol, allowing Defendants to circumvent Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (Protective Order Rule 26 (c); allowing Defendants an additional
3 months (June I order in that "defendants shall submit by June 20, 2007 and
finally submitted September 25, 2007) Defendants motion for attorney fees,
clearly demonstrate that Judge Jones rulings have a disposition towards
Defendants and against Appellant. Not withstanding the Judge Jones bias towards
the parties Judge Jones statements of harassment and other misconduct of
Appellant are not based upon facts that were before the Court.
For all of the Forgoing reasons Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the above orders of Judge Jones.
RESSPHCTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December 2005.
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THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief
and Addendum to be mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 5 l1 day of December,
2008, to:
Stephen W. Farr,
Bamberger Square Building
205 26th Street, Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Steven W. Allred
Attorney for Defendants
1007 East North Bonneville Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Mark Ferrin
Attorney for Defendants
3361 North River Drive
P.O.Box 150
Eden, Utah 84310
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